



# The Long Arc Behind Internet Economics: Five Rules of Thumb

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# Prologue



- ▶ Thanks for giving me the opportunity to speak with you.
- ▶ Happy to hear feedback. All comments welcome

# Motivating question



- If a set of very talented researchers had the opportunity – and funding – to redesign the Internet (or the infrastructure under an advanced data network), using recent past as a guide, what should they do and why?
- Scholarly interest:
  - emergence of new commercial communications network governed by a new (?) set of principles.
  - What long run economic factors shaped value creation during development of commercial Internet?
  - Raise questions. Bring a different perspective.

# Explaining talk's title



- ▶ Organize the talk around “rules of thumb”, not economic “principles”. Why?
  - I will summarize a lot of economic thinking.
  - Not a precise science. One big example (and several small ones) from which to infer generalities.
  - *Eternal truths > Rules of thumb > Yogi Berra*
- ▶ Also cognizant of Spenser Silver’s warning:
  - *“If I had thought about it, I wouldn't have done the experiment. The literature was full of examples that said you can't do this.”*
  - If you believe you can change the world with your research, just go for it and please ignore me.

# Five rules of thumb




- ▶ Limits to the breadth of Moore's law motivates much invention.
- ▶ New functionality diffuses quickly when it gets the platform economics right.
- ▶ Capital deepening differs from investment to encourage participation.
- ▶ Working prototypes catalyze commercial response.
- ▶ Market-oriented experimentation shapes and reshapes priorities.

# Outline



- ▶ **Limits to the breadth of Moore's law motivate much invention.**
- ▶ Platform economics
- ▶ Capital deepening/participation
- ▶ Working prototypes
- ▶ Market oriented experimentation

# Moore's law as a basic and familiar place to start



- What is Moore's Law? Observation about technical improvement in past *and* a forecast for coordinating actions in near future.
- Enables new valuable opportunities.
  - For same cost... performance increase at exponential rate → cost of achieving prior performance declines at exponential rate
  - Range of capabilities by affordable device continues → “new range” = “new mass market capability.”
  - Moore meant it *only* for ICs. What does it have to do w/networks?

# Historical experience suggests a broad construction of metaphor

- Range of hardware experiences similar trend
  - Memory devices, display screens, data switches, data transmission lines, sensors, etc. and so on.
  - Can reasonably expect it to continue.
- But *does not* hold for *all* complementary inputs into frontier networking.
  - New opportunities, but not uniformly for all inputs.
  - Human ability to learn new software languages.
  - Software coding for new applications taking advantage of new hardware capabilities.
  - Last mile delivery/sensor devices.




# Response: Clever inventive activity.



- Economize on expensive input (e.g., humans).
  - By “automating” as much as (cheaply) possible.
- Specialize expensive device to high value use.
  - E.g., Distinct access technologies for distinct uses, including multiple wire-line & wireless modes.
- Redeploy existing capital to new purposes.
  - E.g., Instead of building delivery mechanism from scratch, invent the phone modem – a cheap way to repurpose existing telephone system for new use – and design TCP/IP to run over it.
- In general, “compromise” on an ideal, but make progress in some way.

# More responses (continued)

- Share inventions among costly inputs.
  - Reduce costs of imitation or multi-site deployment of inventive software (e.g., shareware).
  - Develop means to aid disclosure of new discovery while still crediting inventors (e.g., the RFC).
  - Mandate compatibility across components (e.g., DOD TCP/IP compatibility requirements), reducing need to reinvent building blocks.
- Expect similar inventiveness w/GENI...
  - Leave open question of how that will be done institutionally...



# Open questions as Moore's Law continues




- ▶ GENI research rethinks the compromises of prior eras and address scarcity of new era?
- ▶ One idea: Introduce pricing for scarce goods.
  - Accessing network expensive (e.g., for video or for multi-sensor networks)... make users reveal urgency of their send/receive. Let packets “bid” for priority.
  - If transient scarcity in transit capacity... rethink protocols for real-time identification and resolution of scarcity through prices localized to place/time.
- ▶ In networks operator's attention is scarce...
  - Rethink protocols that bring info to operator's attention...

# Outline



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# Diffusion of new invention and platform economics



- ▶ Success at GENI will encounter platforms...
- ▶ Platform = standard bundle of components that users employ together for services.
  - Is the Internet a platform? (Yes. No. Probably.)
  - VERY short answer: Internet has standard bundle... but...also an unprecedented governance structure.
- ▶ Platform economics focuses on emergence (or not) of fragmentation & governance:
  - Fragmentation: large or small set of bundles which users have in common, around which build services.
  - Governance (aka platform leadership): Predictable rules/processes for changing standard bundle.


# Fragmentation tends not to occur in use of network infrastructure

- ▶ Because scale has advantages.
  - Scale allows users/developers to *share* in scarce resources, inventive tools, fixed costs.
  - Scale aggregates capabilities. Easier to *add-on* new capability to existing platform (to expand scope & suit new niche demand) than start from scratch.
  - More participation enables more potential communication, which is more valuable for users.
- ▶ Commercial computing platforms tend to be identified with firm taking leadership.
  - IBM 360/370, DEC VAX, Wintel, dial-up AOL.

# Platforms can fragment b/c...

- ▶ Why not one dominant platform? Somebody always unhappy w/dominant platform.
  - Once dominant platform starts can be hard to stop, but range of scope leaves some niches unfulfilled.
  - Some users want to employ the technology for different purposes and they are willing to pay for it (e.g., very high end computing boxes)
  - User/developers have strong opinions about design choices & options (e.g., Unix design wars).
- ▶ Commercial sponsors have strong strategic incentives to differentiate from others.
  - E.g., Commercial Unix in the 1980s.

# The Internet/WWW experienced curse of success



- ▶ First-gen Internet designed to make progress for users in face of long odds (Historical note: wow, it did), & scaled by accumulating uses...
  - Designed for ftp, e-mail, etc., not to prevent spam...
  - Not for the instantaneous (?!) apps my kids use it for.
  - Presumed known participants, similar research goals, absence of malevolence, lack of commerce, etc....
- ▶ WWW made possible hyper-linked commerce.
  - Designed so researchers could send graphics, etc.
  - Not payments, massive search, identity/privacy, etc.
- ▶ Gives GENI research plenty to improve.



# If new platform in GENI does not respect backward compatibility...

- Opportunity to rethink the assumptions made in the effort to deploy into an installed base.
  - If every developer/user starts from scratch.
- Expect the opportunity directed at high-risk “compelling” new stuff or future “killer app”.
  - Historically... new platforms succeed more often when they attract new users /w new uses... so...
  - Respecting b.c. interferes w/deploying frontier designs at peak performance. Chance to rethink.
  - Sacrifice widespread participation on same platform in short run, raise costs to new adoption of “new” device or serving new niche user.

# The other part of platforms: governance.



- Commercial platforms tend to have core/periphery structure (e.g., MS & Windows).
  - What does core do? Typically (1) sets rules for determining standards, (2) operates processes to alter standards, (3) establishes targets/roadmaps to coordinate developers.
  - Sometimes (4) provides tools to build apps.
  - Leadership: controls pervasive standards on which others build.
- GENI not assuming particular governance form.
  - Focus on building tools, developing new standards...
  - If something starts to succeed, this topic will arise.

# GENI platform organizational model? Unlikely to be traditional.

- ▶ Traditional research: “Teams” of lone wolves.
  - Confederation of academics on same budget.
- ▶ Commercial model: “Teams” in a hierarchy.
  - Core defines layer, invents on one side, enables peripheral developments at another layer.
  - Each periphery “team” aimed at niche use.
  - Core retains control, withholds information from “unfriendly” others, provides tools to periphery.
- ▶ Likely: Mixed developer & user model.
  - Give individual credit, but accumulate advance.
  - Restricted access to code (Apache, Mozilla) or loosely mediated interaction (Wikipedia).



# If GENI follows the norms for self-organizing platforms...

- ▶ Lacks commercial core, but has a hierarchy.
  - ▶ Distribution of effort tends to self-define hierarchy. 1% who do most work, as in 1 / 9 / 90 distribution of contribution. (see. E.g., Apache, Mozilla, Wikipedia).
  - ▶ Cooperation at 1% level, but rivalry within, and mediated etiquette at, other contributor levels.
- ▶ Initially core makes (1) rules for determining standards, (2) processes to alter.
  - ▶ Initially loose about (3) roadmaps/targets, and (4) about making tools for others. The latter emerge over time if there is success.



# Open questions for GENI about platforms



- Rethink infrastructure platform code to support commerce w/o strict end-to-end.
  - Micropayment infrastructure w/ & w/o full identity. Opt-in/out choices about privacy/identity. Who owns what about the user? Who decides? When?
  - Opt-in/out for location/nexus of sales for taxation purposes/economic measurement. Who decides?
- Experiment: ways to get emergent networks from new sets of tools/processes.
  - If the core allows to opt-in/out deeper layers?
  - Which infrastructures enable designs for large scale user-suggested improvements?

# Outline



- ▶ Moore's law
- ▶ Platform economics
- ▶ **Capital deepening differs from investment to encourage participation.**
- ▶ Working prototypes
- ▶ Market oriented experimentation

# Capital deepening distinct from investment to grow participation

- ▶ If anything succeeds, soon will face this...
- ▶ Capital deepening: Increase performance of existing processes already in use.
  - Usually with the intent/goal of enabling scale.
  - E.g., Investment that increases bandwidth of high-capacity backbone or large scale routing.
- ▶ Investment to grow participation.
  - Develop new processes or products, usually with goal/intent of motivating new users to join, or migrate activity from one niche use to the network.
  - E.g., The windows-based browser (Mosaic) made hyperlink computing accessible to general user.



# Why are these distinct?



- ▶ Deepening/participation often involve different actors and distinct specializations.
    - Expertise needed for invention/investment differ.
  - ▶ Need each other to be prosperous.
    - Incentives to invest in one (e.g., backbone services) depends on how parties are compensated in other (e.g., access services).
    - Some scale will emerge if there will be success.
  - ▶ Inherent tensions for network at boundaries.
    - What is neglected due to lack of coordination?
    - Unbalanced growth b/w parts?
- Boundary & discretion. Who is responsible for what?



# More inherent tensions: Scale and variety trade-offs

- ▶ Deepening for scale helps & hurts variety
  - Capital deepening → refine processes → become basis for accumulating “add-ons” → scale can become basis for a variety of new developments to address groups of specific niches.
  - Interconnected refined process impose constraints on systemic invention → suppress variety.
- ▶ Parties w/distinct views over best use of expensive asset → conflict over refinement.
  - Example: Contemporary “neutrality” fights b/w broadband carriers & content providers over control to routing/delivery.



# Questions for GENI about deepening/participation.



- ▶ Question: Prior Internet grew participation through deployment of TCP/IP to wide variety of installations.
  - Many proposals for rethinking price or non-price mechanisms for routing or access have implications for governance at boundary b/w different actors.
  - Cloud computing, similar boundary issues.
  - Researchers makes choices about enabled variety.
- ▶ Even more out there: Third world user base.
  - Thin networks to grow participation in resource-poor regions distinct from capital deepening? How do these complement?

# Outline



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# Working prototypes




- ▶ Any success will generate a working prototype...
  - ▶ Working prototype: a tangible demonstration of a frontier process or design.
    - Show theoretical concept in workable solution.
    - E.g., “running code” beats “prospective solution.”
  - ▶ Why important to complex technologies?
    - Identify solutions to bottleneck issues.
    - Reduce uncertainty about viability of proposal.
    - Sharpen estimates about design trade-offs.
    - Satisfy impatient user/vendor who wants *workable* now instead of promise about *better* tomorrow.
- Aids forecasting.

# A broad understanding of design/value of a prototype



- ▶ More than merely technical prototypes.
  - Also value in illustrating a workable new process or institution for enabling new activity (e.g., CIX).
  - Building bandwagons of use/improvement around technology or standards (e.g., SMTP, WWW).
- ▶ Prototypes can be especially catalytic for non-research participants.
  - Regulatory actors hesitate in absence of illustration (e.g., FCC has little incentive to take risks).
  - VCs hesitate (e.g., due to short time horizons).
  - Skeptical commercial managers may not “perceive the user value” (e.g., Gates and the browser).

# How prototyping research shapes goals at GENI



- ▶ If some value cannot be learned until it involves regulatory actors, VCs, and skeptical commercial managers, why is GENI valuable?
  - Other actors have distinct milestones for measuring progress, distinct visions of value of opportunity, distinct capabilities for aspects of frontier.
  - They will interpret prototypes in a variety of ways...
- ▶ Inherently unpredictable response: Widely dispersed technical leadership (e.g., many orgs employ technical skilled personnel).
  - No single vision captures technical conversation. (e.g., BBSs first commercial firms to deploy WWW).

# Open Questions for GENI about working prototypes



- ▶ If rethinking traffic management thru time/place auctions or prioritizing & aggregating massive inform in real time...raise questions.
  - How to prototype results to show a non-technical observer? To demonstrate value?
  - How to prototype to test its macro-system properties, e.g., consequences of partially applied micro-pricing rules. (e.g., does saving cost in one place raises in another? And so on.).
- ▶ How to prototype the value from increased participation, when GENI limits participation?
  - Building communities around student participation.
  - Experiments with emergent social networks... among user/developers...

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# Post-GENI: Mkt-oriented deployment & experimentation



- ▶ Actions to learn about value that cannot otherwise be learned in lab or w/user survey.
  - Full mkt value uncertain until this type of action.
- ▶ Different learning (illustration from 1997–98)
  - Technical features of new equipment (e.g., features of a 56K modem bank).
  - Operations for new equipment (e.g., to learn about regular peak load time/use patterns).
  - Market position (e.g., how much to charge and bundle with other services?)
  - Business organization logic (e.g., charge for complementary services or let others provide it?).

# GENI is valuable for market-oriented experimentation



- ▶ Why frontier research computer science valuable. It finds its way into myriad uses.
  - Accelerates development in private R&D.
  - Fosters substitutes (e.g., 802.11 v 2G/3G).
  - Fosters complements that work together or build on one another (e.g., Mosaic browser/Apache server).
  - Fosters systems where whole greater than sum of parts (e.g., broad based electronic commerce).
- ▶ Letting a thousand flowers bloom inevitably leads to a mess.
  - After solution becomes known, exploratory investment looks like waste of resources.

# Open questions for GENI about experimentation




- ▶ Can pioneering work be positioned in advance of *inevitable* experimentation by commercial actors?
- ▶ First gen Internet was not sure the research would leave their small community.
  - Stuff makes its way into commercial use w/big benefits (e.g., imagine the benefit if TCP/IP had made it into private use a decade earlier).
- ▶ GENI not market oriented, by design, but that does not mean not valuable for mkt actors.
  - It can have a huge value by helping commercial actors rethink their own designs.

# Time to cool down



# Summary: Five rules of thumb

- ▶ What economic principles shape creation of value during commercialization of internet?
    - Limits to the breadth of Moore's law motivate much invention.
    - New functionality diffuses quickly when it gets the platform economics right.
    - Capital deepening differs from investment to encourage participation.
    - Working prototypes catalyze commercial response.
    - Market-oriented experimentation shapes and reshapes priorities.
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# Thank you

- ▶ Thank you for your attention.

